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Quota, a computer-based simulation game, originated as an experimental game for testing alternative multi-resource 
management regimes or systems.  Highly flexible, it allows specification for a standard common-property, open-access 
fishery with user-specified bio-economic fishery growth model and multiple sized producers with individual harvest and 
cost functions.  In addition to demonstrating overfishing under open-access, various forms of Property Rights Systems 
can be implemented, including the setting of an overall Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and further allocation of the TAC to 
individual producers -- Individual Quota Rights (IQR) -- that may be based on historical catch during initial periods of Open 
Access fishing or equal shares or shares determined by bargaining amongst the players (producers).  Subsequent trading 
of IQRs is also implemented using a highly developed computerized trading game.  Recent use of the game have been as 
an educational tool in university classes on resource economics and in the field at meetings of Regional Fishing 
Management Organizations that govern the major tuna fisheries around the world.
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1Winslow Homer: The Herring Net, 1885
I. Quota: An Educational Tool
2   
1.  Open access leads to over-exploitation of 
fish stocks, even if initially there is no 
apparent excess capacity in the fishery,
2.  Fish stocks can be rebuilt to optimal and 
sustainable levels by limiting the total catch 
AND allocating the harvest to individuals 
(vessels or states).
Purpose of the game - Quota : I
To make Rights Based Management (RBM) 
easier to understand and appreciated by 
demonstrating the following points.  
3 Purpose of the game - Quota : II
3.  Access to fishing can be guaranteed to 
nations, communities, or individuals by defining 
appropriate RBM rules for the distribution and 
transfer of the rights to fish.   
4.  Alternative distributions fishery rents, 
incomes, or profits can be achived by different 
allocations of harvest rights.
4
4 Purpose of the game - Quota : III
5. Total Value of the fishery can be 
maximized by the trading of individual 
harvest rights.  
6. Permanent access to fish by any nation, 
community, or individual can be ensured 
by limiting the trading of harvest rights.  
5
5 Target Audiences for Quota
1.  Fishery Managers (e.g. RFMO governing 
bodies & Government officials)
2.  Industry participants (e.g. boat owners, 
captains, processors, retail buyers, fishing 
communities, etc.)
3.  Other stake-holders (e.g. conservation 
NGOs, general public)
4.  Education (e.g. college students, others) 
6
6Winslow Homer: The Gulf Stream, 1899
III. The ‘Quota’ Fishery Model
7Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)
• The Stock of fish grows between each period.  
• Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) = 4,375  at a stock level of 
17,500 (for this example).
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8The Fishing Technology: I
• Fishing fleet has N  boats
• 3 types of boats: Large, Medium and Small
• N/3 boats of each type,  
            where size is given by capacity
-Large boats:         Capacity = 400 fish units
-Medium boats:      Capacity = 250 fish units
-Small boats:          Capacity = 100 fish units
9The Fishing Technology: II
• Profit = (price) *(catch) – (cost of fishing)
-Price =  monetary units/fish unit  (e.g. 3 euros/)kilo
-Catch = (boat-specific harvest rate)*(effort)*(stock)
-Cost = (capacity specific fixed cost) + (quadratic 
function of effort, with boat-specific parameters) 
‣i.e. it is increasingly expensive to further increase 
effort, including time spent fishing, gear used, fuel 
consumed, and other variable inputs.
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10The Fishing Technology: III
•Effort:
-The percent of the maximum fishing activity 
that a boat can deploy -- a number between 0 
and 100, where 50 represents a “normal” level 
of effort.  
-Effort may also be interpreted as Fishing Days, 
where 100 represents fishing the maximum 
number of days that can possibly be fished in a 
season.
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11Profit Functions (examples)
stock size = 12,500 stock size = 8548
Note: Different Vertical (Profit) Scales. Graphs 
show how profit possibilites depend on the 
stock.
12Winslow Homer: Fishing Boats, Key West, 1903 
IV. Quota: Management Regimes
13Fishery Management Regimes
- Open Access - competitive ﬁshery
- RBM based on setting a Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC) followed by an allocation of quota to 
individual boats
• Open Access vs. Rights Based Management (RBM)
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V. Two Quota Games
15Two TAC Allocation Games: I
16
Text
1.  Games of T periods:  T1 periods of Open Access 
followed by T2 periods of an allocated TAC.
2.  Two different basic schemes for allocating the TAC 
are implemented in the quota games
16Two TAC Allocation Games: II
17
Text
3.  In one game, the TAC is allocated based on the 
Historical Catch of each boat, that is, the fraction of 
total catch during the periods of Open Access that 
each boat harvested.
4.  In the other game, the TAC is allocated equally to 
every boat, that is, each boat is given a Quota of 1/N 
of the TAC, where N is the number of boats in the 
fishery.
‣ Note: Although not implemented in Quota yet, 
allocated quotas may be subsequently 
traded in a market for trading quota shares.
17Open Access Screen
Step 2
Step 3 Step 4
Countdown timer
Step 1
18TAC Allocation Screen
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VI. Interpreting the Results
20Examples of Game Outcomes: I
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21Game Examples: III
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22Interpretation: I
• During Open Access periods the total stock of 
fish declined and so did profits.  Continued open 
access fishing causes a collapse of the fishery 
and the loss of all income from fishing.  
• Introducing a TAC and a rule for adjusting the 
TAC to re-build stocks to the desired level was 
successful when the TAC was enforced.  Total 
fishery income increased to close to the 
maximum.
23Interpretation: II
• Enforcement of the TAC was accomplished by 
granting an Individual Allowable Catch (or, a 
Quota) to each boat and assessing a penalty for 
fishing beyond one’s allowed catch.
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24• In Game 2, (under equal allocation), the small 
boats could not profitably fish all their quotas, 
even as stocks were rebuilt, thus some of the 
TAC was left unharvested.
Interpretation: III
25 
• Because not all the TAC was harvested in later 
periods in Game 2, total industry profits could 
(potentially) be increased.
• However, if the small boats could sell or lease 
their unfished quota to large boats, both sized 
boats would benefit and total industry profits 
would be higher than in Game 2.                     
(This point will be demonstrated in a future version 
of the Quota Game in which the opportunity to 
trade quota rights is added to the game.)
Interpretation: IV
26Future Development Plans
• Trading of Quota (currently under development)
• Bargaining over Management Regime
-when to begin limiting catch (imposing TAC)
-what level to set TAC and how fast to rebuild stocks
-what distribution of TAC to implement, including the rules 
for trading of quota shares
• Multiple species fisheries and by-catch
• Spatial Management (time & area closures)
• Capacity management (entry/exit; buyback of 
existing capacity - an auction game)
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27Winslow Homer: Inside the Bar, 1883
Thank you!
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